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Abstract 
 
Our analysis proceeds from the question that if grammar alone is insufficient to 
identify the action of an imperative (e.g., offering, directing, warning, begging, etc.) 
how can interlocutors come to recognise the specific action being performed by a 
given imperative? We argue that imperative directives that occur after the directed 
action could have first been relevantly performed explicitly direct the actions of the 
recipient and tacitly treat the absence of the action as a failure for which the recipient 
is accountable. The tacit nature of the accountability orientation enables both parties 
to focus on restoring progressivity to the directed course of action rather than 
topicalising a transgression. Data are from everyday interactions in British and 
American English. 
 
Keywords: conversation analysis, imperative, directive, transgression, progressivity, 
accountability 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imperatives are one of the three major sentence types, together with interrogatives and 
declaratives (Sadock & Zwicky, 1985). Like other grammatical formats (e.g., 
interrogatives, see Schegloff, 1984), speakers use imperatives to perform a wide range 
of actions, including offering, directing, warning, initiating repair, and begging among 
others. The multiplicity of actions that imperatives perform leads to a puzzle, one that 
analysts and participants alike must solve: If an imperative format does not afford a 
default analysis of its action (e.g., as a request or directive), then how do participants 
come to recognise the specific action(s) that an imperative performs?  
 
Imperatives are an example of the Òone-to-many and many-to-one relationshipsÓ 
between linguistic forms (i.e., practices) and interactional functions (i.e., actions) that 
Walker (2014) discusses as she cautions conversation analysts against conflating form 
and function. In this paper, we begin to disentangle imperative grammar from (some 
of) the many actions it is used to perform. We narrow in on a specific interactional 
contingency that speakers recurrently use imperative actions to manage: directing the 
actions of others (Goodwin, 2006; Craven & Potter, 2010; Kent, 2012b; Goodwin & 
Cekaite, 2013). That is, first pair parts that make embodied compliance conditionally 
relevant as a next action (Kent 2012a). Within this class of imperative directives, we 
observe two basic types: (i) those that simply direct the actions of others (e.g., Òpass 
the bread pleaseÓ) and (ii) those that not only prospectively direct the actions of others 
but also retrospectively treat the recipient as accountable for their current actions or 
inaction (e.g., Òtell me the goddamn storyÓ).  
 
This paper examines the interactional resources that participants use to recognise 
whether an imperative directive simply tells them to do something or also tacitly 
holds them accountable for failing to have already relevantly performed the action. 
We argue that the position of the imperative directive within a course of action is 
crucial. Imperative directives that follow the relevance of the directed action not only 
direct the recipient to act but also find fault in his or her current actions or inaction.  
 
 
BACKGROUND 
!
Grammar and action 
!
With apparent ease and remarkable speed, participants in interaction are able to 
recognise the action that a turn at talk implements and produce a relevant response. 
Just how this is done, however, remains elusive. Schegloff (2007) states the problem 
as follows: Òhow are the resources of the language, the body, the environment of the 
interaction, and position in the interaction fashioned into conformations designed to 
be, and to be recognized by recipients as, particular actionsÉ?Ó (p. xiv). In general, 
two solutions to this problem seem possible (Levinson, 2013). First, the form of an 
action (the linguistic construction of a turn at talk, the physical production of a 
gesture) may furnish the resources necessary for its recognition. Early philosophical 
investigations of action adopted this position (e.g., Austin, 1962) and recent empirical 
studies have suggested that such a solution may be possible (Couper-Kuhlen, 2014). 
Second, the context in which an action occurs, not only its form, may provide the 
necessary resources. This has been the dominant position in CA since SacksÕs (1992) 
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insight that answers depend on questions to be recognisable as such. Sequence-
initiating actions have also been shown to be sensitive to sequential position, taking 
different forms in different environments (Wootton, 1997; Curl, 2006; Rossi, 2012, 
2014; Zinken & Ogiermann, 2013). In a more recent turn, the specification of context 
thought relevant for action recognition has been radically extended beyond the local 
sequence to include properties of individuals, such as epistemic status (Heritage, 
2012), deontic authority (Stevanovic & Perkyl, 2012), and personal benefit 
(Clayman & Heritage, 2014).  
 
In the case of directives, it is evident that imperative grammar alone is not sufficient 
for action recognition. If an imperative can just as well express a wish as give a 
command (e.g., Ògive me a tenÓ as one rolls dice), then clearly more than imperative 
grammar is necessary. Moreover, as Mandelbaum (2014) has shown, participants can 
use directives to implement multiple actions simultaneously, adding a further 
dimension to the problem of action recognition. For example, when discussing a 
motherÕs directive to her son to Òcut that (up)/(out)Ó, Schegloff (1989) noted in 
passing that it Òis not just an injunction or instruction, or request. In setting out an 
alternative way of eating, it can do a complaint about his prior behaviourÓ (p. 149).  
 
 
Accountability 
 
Drew (1998, p. 297) notes that actions can be Òbuilt to manifest transgressions by 
others of normative standards of conductÓ. Calling an interlocutor to account for their 
behaviour can be used to highlight and police normative social standards. Researchers 
have described a broad range of practices through which one interlocutor can hold 
another accountable for non-normative or transgressive conduct: unanswerable polar 
interrogatives (Heinemann, 2008), ÒwhÓ-questions (Koshik, 2005; Bolden & 
Robinson, 2011), characterising something as absent or a failure (Schegloff, 1988), 
negative assessments about the recipientÕs behaviour (Hepburn & Potter, 2011), 
extreme-case formulations (Edwards, 2000), and formulating behaviour as 
dispositional (Edwards, 1995) or collusive (Potter & Edwards, 1990). Stances towards 
the accountability of conduct can be signalled though related actions such as 
Òaccusing, criticising, blaming, challenging, advising, and so onÓ (Robinson, 2016, p. 
31). 
 
Recognising how and when speakers hold each other accountable for failing to 
perform an expected action is a subtle and delicate matter that is not always 
performed overtly in interaction. For example, oh-prefaced responses to inquiries 
indicate that, Òfrom the perspective of the answerer, a question is problematic in terms 
of its relevance, presuppositions, or contextÓ (Heritage, 1998, p. 291). It doesnÕt take 
much to add in a hint of accountability to an utterance. As Robinson (2016) notes, 
Òchanging the ÒmixÓ of practices (including both their composition and position) can 
subtly or dramatically change the nature of the actionÓ (p. 19). We investigate how 
imperative directives (actions designed to get someone to do something) can also be 
heard as tacitly holding recipients accountable for delaying the progressivity of the 
directed action. 
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Projectability and progressivity 
 
In interaction, actions (whether produced through language or the body) can produce 
recognisable, normative structures that develop over time. At the level of turn-taking, 
Sacks et al. (1974) described how participants monitor each otherÕs talk for how it 
progresses towards possible completion points that would indicate a relevant place for 
speaker transition. At the level of adjacency pairs, Schegloff (2007) described how 
particular kinds of initiating actions make relevant type-fitted responsive actions. 
Pairs of actions can be strung together into complex sequences of sequences 
(Schegloff, 2007), which themselves can form recognisable activities (Levinson, 
1992; Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994), all of which occur within the overall structural 
organisation of the interaction (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Robinson, 2013). At each 
level of structure, the progressive realisation of an action allows for the projection of 
what is yet to come (Lerner & Raymond, 2008). 
 
The structure of a course of action, be it the telling of a story or the preparation of a 
meal, sets up normative expectations about how participants will behave and what 
form their contributions will take. In many cases, Òthe recognizability of completion 
(i.e., what it will take to materially complete a project) and the projectability of that 
completion from the outset of the activityÓ can provide an accountable and easily 
monitored frame of projectable relevance to structure participation in the activity 
(Lerner, 1995, p. 129). Thus, courses of action that have been initiated but have not 
yet come to completion remain relevant and consequential for the interaction until 
they have reached a recognisable conclusion.  
 
Interlocutors are morally responsible for recognising, understanding and adhering to 
relevance rules (including the normative progressivity of courses of action). Non-
performance of a relevant action is an accountable and sanctionable matter (Garfinkel, 
1963, 1967), particularly for courses of action to which both parties have displayed a 
prior commitment (c.f., Rossi, 2012). The smooth and timely progression through a 
course of action to its eventual completion can be monitored on the basis of the 
projectable relevance of the constituent elements. As Schegloff (2007, p. 15) states, 
Òmoving from some element to a hearably next one with nothing intervening is the 
embodiment of, and the measure of, progressivityÓ. Once a course of action has been 
initiated, participants can orient to the relevance of its completion (Lerner, 1998; 
Lerner & Raymond, 2008), such that if it stalls or fails to progress, participants may 
use practices designed to reinstate progressivity. Importantly, as Lerner and Raymond 
have shown, progressivity and projectability operate not only on courses of action 
implemented through talk but also those implemented through embodied actions.  
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
The analysis draws on a broad collection of over 690 grammatical imperatives 
systematically identified in 46 video-recorded interactions between speakers of 
English in the U.K. and U.S across a variety of non-institutional settings. 
Approximately 9 hours of data are of adult interactions and approximately 5 hours 
involve children and adults. All names appearing in transcripts are pseudonyms and 
informed consent was gained for all recordings.  
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Consistent with conversation analysis, it is possible to begin an analysis with either 
practices or actions. In contrast to previous studies of directives, which have taken the 
social action as their point of departure (e.g., Kent, 2012b), our methodological 
approach mirrors that of Schegloff (1997, p. 506) who began with a series of practices 
for initiating repair and proceeded to Òexamine occasions in which they are deployed 
to quite different effectÓ. By starting with grammatical imperatives rather than the 
social action of admonishing or directing we aim to address MondadaÕs (2011, p. 19) 
observation that Òstudies focusing on directives produced by using imperative verbs 
are scarce, and their situated use in specific social actions remains understudiedÓ (but 
see Rossi, 2012; Zinken & Ogiermann, 2013). !
 
The analysis presented below focuses only on cases in which an imperative performed 
the action of a directive Ð to make observable compliance (as opposed to non-
observable compliance, e.g., ÒimagineÓ) relevant immediately in next position (Kent, 
2012a). In restricting our focus to imperative directives, we have excluded the 
following types of imperatives from our analysis:   
 
-! Deferred action requests (e.g., "tell me how it goes"; Lindstrom, 1997);  
-! Cognitive-state imperatives (e.g., Òimagine this is the building I live inÓ);  
-! Affective-state imperatives (e.g., Òbe confidentÓ);  
-! Turn-initial particles (e.g., ÒlookÓ, ÒseeÓ);  
-! First-person imperatives (e.g., ÒletÕs XÓ,  Òlet me XÓ);  
-! Prohibitives or grammatically negative imperatives (e.g., ÒdonÕt whisperÓ).  
 
 
IMPERATIVES THAT PRECEDE  
THE RELEVANCE OF THE DIRECTED ACTION 
 
The imperative directives in our collection formulate actions for recipients to perform 
in next position. In many cases, the action the imperative directs the recipient to 
perform (i.e., the directed action) has no relevance prior to the production of the 
imperative. The imperative itself initiates a course of action and establishes the 
relevance of the directed action. In this position, an imperative directive simply 
directs the recipient to perform a newly relevant action. In Extract 1, Wesley issues 
the imperative directive to Mum for her to Òpass the bread (please)Ó (line 7). 
 
Extract 1 (Virginia 11:42) 
1  PRU:   He got knee walkin' drunk. at thuh wu- 
2  MOM:   At the [wedding. 
3  PRU:          [rehearsal.<I mean at thuh: wedding reception. 
4         (0.4) 
5  MOM:   [úu  h  h  h  h  h  h  h  h ] ((through mouth)) 
6  PRU:   [t!A:N:' somebody pushed 'im] in the pool. 
7  WES:   *Pass the* bread, +[(please.) 
8  PRU:                      [An' he thought it was so much fu:n,  
   wes    *points--* 
   pru                      +reaches for bread basket--> 
9         th't he went back n'- an'+ got up on thuh diving board,  
   pru                          -->+passes it to Wes-->> 
10        anÕ started divin' inÀ ehhhh! huh! 
 
Note that there is no prior indication that Wesley might be seeking to have the bread 
passed to him. As an action, Prudence passing him the bread is only made relevant 
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once Wesley has issued the directive. Consequently the directed action was not 
projectable until the directive has been issued. 
 
Although imperative directives can initiate courses of action, as happens here, they 
more commonly occur within courses of action that have already been set in motion 
(Wootton, 1997; Rossi, 2012; Zinken & Ogiermann, 2013; Mondada, 2014a). We 
have found that speakers can use imperative directives to progress from one ÔstepÕ of 
a course of action to a next (cf. Schegloff, 2007). The next step in a course of action 
may be projectable (i.e., it will need to happen at some point), but the immediate 
relevance of the directed action (i.e., position in which it should occur) is nonetheless 
still contingent upon the directive.  
 
In Extract 2, Dad is demonstrating visual convergence to his two daughters. The 
crucial part of the demonstration is the moment when they switch their focus from 
MumÕs nose (which is distant) to the pen (which is nearby).  
 
Extract 2 (FF06 17:20)   
1  DAD:   alright? if you look at mu:mmyÕs no::se, 
2         (0.5) 
3  DAD:   anÕ I: put this pen in front of your face, 
4         >donÕt look at the pe:n 
5         (0.5) 
6  DAD:   ¡do:nÕt look at thÕpe:n¡ 
7         (0.2) 
8  DAD:   ¡but¡ you can see this pe:nÕs here ca:nÕt you 
9         (0.3) 
10 DAD:   ¡Õut¡ you ca:nÕt fo:cus on it. 
11        (0.5) 
12 DAIS:  uh(h)uhhm 
13        (.) 
14 DAD:   now concentrate on the pe:n. 
15        (1.1) 
16 DAD:   you can see: mummy behi:nd (.) but youÕre not  
17        fo:cusing on her.  
 
Although the nature of the experiment makes it projectable that Daisy will need to 
look at the pen at some point, the exact moment at which that action becomes relevant 
is contingent upon (and established by) DadÕs imperative directive Ònow concentrate 
on the pe:n.Ó (line 14). Before the directive is issued, Daisy is not remiss in not having 
already looked at the pen, as Dad's previous prohibitives make apparent (lines 4 and 
6). 
 
In both cases above the relevance of the directed action follows the production of the 
imperative. This holds for imperative directives that initiate courses of action as well 
as those that prospectively manage in-progress courses of action. There is no evidence 
in the interaction that the imperative directives find fault with the recipients' actions 
or inactions or hold them accountable for some failure to have performed a 
projectably relevant action.  
 
 
IMPERATIVES THAT FOLLOW  
THE RELEVANCE OF THE DIRECTED ACTION 
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In contrast, imperatives that are issued after the directed action has already become 
projectable and relevant within the interaction not only explicitly direct the recipient 
to perform the action and thereby enforce its production, but they also tacitly treat the 
recipient as accountable for not having already done so. We might gloss these as 
accountability-oriented imperative directives. In this section, we illustrate the core 
phenomenon with two initial cases and then consider how responses to imperative 
directives in this position provide evidence for the analysis. 
 
 
Two initial specimens of the phenomenon 
 
Across the collection, imperative directives that follow the relevance of the directed 
action generally differ along two dimensions: how the directed action becomes 
relevant in the interaction and how overtly the participants orient to the recipientÕs 
accountability for the prior performance of the action. The two initial specimens in 
this section indicate the diversity that we observe the collection. 
 
Extract 3 below, comes from a game of Monopoly between two friends. After they set 
up the board, Luke produces a story preface (Sacks, 1974), projecting the relevance of 
a story-telling (line 2). However, rather then produce a response that would allow the 
story to progress, Rick blocks the telling, proposing that they first establish the rules 
of the game (lines 3-5).  
  
Extract 3a (Monopoly Boys 02:57) 
1  RIC:   Alright [uhm 
2  LUK:           [So I got ah story to te:ll you::.    
3  RIC:   Ah well le:t's go:: leÕs jusÕ get the ru:les.  
4  LUK:   Ohkay= 
5  RIC:   =¡outta the way first.¡ 
 
After about five minutes of gameplay, Luke re-initiates the story-telling, now using a 
gloss of the storyÕs climax: ÒSo: I almost ki:lled someone toda:yÓ.  
 
Extract 3b (Monopoly Boys 07:45) 
6  LUK:   So: I almost ki:lled someone toda:y. 
7         (0.2) 
8  RIC:   .tch Are you se:rious? 
9  LUK:   Yah. 
10        (1.1) 
11 RIC:   WitÕ your ba:re hands? 
12        (0.2) 
13 LUK:   No:, With a te:nnis ba:ll. 
14        (0.3) 
15 RIC:   mhhmph- 
16        (0.7) 
17 LUK:   mmtch Se:rhious(h)l[hy hhuh 
18 RIC:                      [Alright +exphla:in th(h)at 
   luk                                +..............--> 
19        +(0.2)+ 
   luk    -->+picks up dice+        
20 LUK:   Alri:ght +well 
                   +shakes dice--> 
21        (0.8)+(0.6)+ 
   luk      -->+rolls dice+ 
22        (0.6)    
23 LUK:   after my: (0.4) BO:::om communi: (.) ches::t  
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After a series of other-initiations of repair (lines 8-17), with which Rick display his 
ritualized disbelief (Heritage, 1984; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006), LukeÕs second 
attempt to launch the story secures a go-ahead response at line 18 (Òexphla:in 
th(h)atÓ), making the telling of the story the sequentially relevant next action.
1
 
However, rather than tell the story, Luke picks up the dice and rolls, taking his next 
turn in the game and deferring the story (lines 19-23). Four more story initiations 
occur over the next three minutes (not shown), yet each fails to produce the story as 
the participants repeatedly prioritise the progressivity of the game over the story-
telling sequence. The final initiation appears in Extract 3c. 
 
Extract 3c (Monopoly Boys 11:27) 
24        +(0.5)+ 
   luk    +sets empty can down+ 
25 LUK:   alri(h)ght.  
26        +(0.3)+ 
   luk    +picks up unopened can+ 
27 RIC:   alright.=tell me the goddamn sto(h)ry.  
28 LUK:   o[kay  
29 RIC:    [before you roll. be[cause if you canÕt y- 
30 LUK:                        [before I roll. 
31        (0.2) 
32 RIC:   we can't tell a story as (we're) playing  
 
At a lapse in the conversation and between turns in the game, Luke puts down an 
empty can of beer, picks up a new one, and produces ÒalrightÓ as a Òchange of activity 
tokenÓ (Gardner, 2007). This indicates his preparedness for the next, possibly game-
related action. The pauses on lines 24 and 26 are opportunities in which Luke could, 
but does not, resume the telling. It is in this interactional environment that Rick issues 
the imperative directive: Òtell me the goddamn sto(h)ryÓ (line 27).  
 
The relevance of the directed action precedes the directive itself. The multiple 
attempts to launch the story have established the relevance of its telling such that its 
absence has become noticeable and its production enforceable, as evidenced by the 
directive. The increment Òbefore you rollÓ (line 30) makes explicit that the story 
should be told before Luke takes his next turn in the game. It treats LukeÕs 
involvement in the game as the cause of the delay, holding him accountable for the 
inaction. Moreover, RickÕs account initially attributes responsibility to Luke explicitly 
(Òbecause if you canÕt y-Ó) before a subsequent self-repair (from ÒyouÓ to ÒweÓ) 
collectivises the blame (see Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007). The design of the imperative 
itself orients to the recipientÕs accountability for the production of the directed action. 
The insertion of the expletive ÒgoddamnÓ displays the speakerÕs frustration and 
upgrades the directive, constructing it as a subsequent and perhaps final attempt to 
elicit the story.  
 
In Extract 3, the orientation to the recipientÕs accountability for prior non-
performance of the directed action is explicit. Across the collection, however, explicit 
                                                
1
 We note that Òexphla:in th(h)atÓ is not only a go-ahead response but is also an imperative directive. 
Although the directed action is projectable at this point in the interaction, the moment at which it 
becomes relevant is contingent upon the directive itself, as a go-ahead. The directive is therefore 
analogous to that in Extract 2.  
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references to accountability are the exception. Instead, orientations to accountability 
typically occurred more tacitly, as though smuggled beneath an explicit imperative 
directive that targets getting the recipient to perform the directed action. Extract 4 
comes from the beginning of a family mealtime after the food has been served but 
before the participants have begun to eat. When asked how to say ÒletÕs enjoyÓ in 
French, seven-year-old Emily responds Òbon appetitÓ, an expression that normally 
marks the commencement of a meal. Rather than begin to eat, however, Emily begins 
to repeat Òbon appetitÓ in a lyrical tone, the third of which appears on line 1.  
 
Extract 4 (FA802 01:27)  
1  EMY:   bon [appertee 
2  MUM:       [mm hmm   
3      (0.9) 
4  DAD:   mm: 
5      (0.8) 
6  EMY:   u:m (0.2) ¡jusÕ me?¡  
7      +(0.5) 
   emy    +leans twd Mum with her nearest palm upwards--> 
8  EMY:   ¡bon+ [app+]tit¡    
           -->+,,,,,+ 
9  MUM:         [ea:t] 
10      +(0.2) 
   emy    +leans twd Dad with her nearest palm upwards--> 
11 EMY:   [¡bon+ [app+]tit¡   
            -->+,,,,,+picks up cutlery-->> 
12 MUM:          [Ea:t.] 
 
The structure of the activity in which the participants are engaged (a family mealtime) 
provides for the relevance of specific actions, eating being foremost among them. The 
expression Òbon appetitÓ marks the transition from serving to eating, but Emily 
transforms this transitional action into an activity in its own right Ð singing Òbon 
appetitÓ and thereby delays the meal. In this interactional environment, the absence of 
the relevant next action Ð beginning to eat Ð is evidentially noticeable to Mum who 
interrupts EmilyÕs fourth verse of Òbon appetitÓ with the imperative directive Òea:tÓ 
(line 9). The directive enforces the relevance of the directed action, treats EmilyÕs 
actions as sanctionable, and on that basis tacitly holds her accountable for the delay. 
After Emily continues her playful performance (lines 10-11), Mum reissues her 
directive, which eventually elicits the relevant action as Emily picks up her cutlery 
and begins to eat (line 11).  
 
In comparison to Extract 3, the orientation to the recipientÕs accountability for the 
performance of the previously-relevant directed action is less explicit in Extract 4. 
The prosodic stress with which Mum says Òea:tÓ is the only turn design feature 
present to index accountability. Prosodic stress can invite a recipient to search for 
what it locates as the other part of a pair (Schegloff, 1998). In this case, the stress on 
Òea:tÓ potentially locates EmilyÕs current actions as the other member of the set, 
selects the directed action as the relevant and appropriate behaviour, and thereby 
treats her current actions as inappropriate and not currently relevant. In this way, the 
prosodically stressed imperative performs not only explicitly directs the recipient to 
perform the directed action, enforcing the relevance of its production, but it also finds 
fault in her current actions and tacitly orients to her accountability for the prior non-
performance of the directed action.  
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Extracts 3 and 4 use imperatives to explicitly direct the actions of the recipient. We 
argue they also (to varying degrees) tacitly treat the absence of the action as a 
noticeable failure for which the recipient is being held accountable. In the remainder 
of this section we will address how recipients orient to the prior relevance of the 
directed action and their accountability for failing to have performed it when it first 
became relevant. We also consider the limits of this phenomenon by exploring cases 
where a tacit orientation to accountability rests solely on the sequential position of the 
imperative directive without additional turn design indicators. A concomitant 
consideration throughout will be the different grounds on which an action comes to be 
treated as both relevant (and noticeably absent) within the interaction.  
 
 
Orientations to Accountability in Next Position 
 
The preferred response to an imperative directive is immediate embodied compliance 
(Kent, 2012a). An imperative is built to prioritise the swift performance of the 
directed action over any accounts, apologies or other displays of contrition. The 
preference organisation for directive sequences thus does not promote the kind of 
responses that would explicitly orient to the imperative as holding the recipient 
accountable for their inaction. As a consequence, when a recipient is faced with an 
explicit imperative to perform a directed action and a tacit implication that they are 
accountable for failing to have performed a relevant action, additional work is 
required in order to orient to both elements of the utterance. In most cases it is not in 
the recipientÕs interest to explicitly topicalise their potential complicity when the 
imperative speaker has given them the means to skirt around it by responding solely 
to the explicit directive.  
 
Previous research has shown that by doing something other than straight compliance, 
recipients can moderate or transform their compliance into some other action (e.g., to 
appear to be acting independently of the authority of the directive speaker without 
directly resisting the directive action (c.f., Kent 2012b on incipient compliance). Our 
data contained examples of recipients doing additional work to evidence an 
orientation to their accountability for failing to perform the directed action when it 
first became relevant.  
 
In Extract 5, upon finishing a biscuit, Jessica stands on her chair and reaches towards 
the plate of biscuits in the centre of the table. She is sanctioned for this behaviour 
through DadÕs imperative directive that she should Òsi:t anÕ a::skÓ (line 8). In 
response, Jessica sits down abruptly (line 9) and then hunches her body position in a 
display of contrition (lines 11) before transitioning into a new activity (looking at 
Mum through the holes in her biscuit; line 12). 
 
Extract 5 (FA03_10:26) 
1  Mum:   nha a bit cru#nchy?    
2         (0.6)+(0.1)+(1.2)+ 
   jes         +nods +moves in chair, wiggles+ 
3  Dad:   ¡r¡ they ni:ce 
4         (0.1)+(1.6) 
   jes         +stands up on chair, reaches out-->   
5  Emy:   [¡I like them too¡ 
6  Mum:   [I thi:nk you liked them la:st [time we had them 
7  Dad:          [((cough cough)) 
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8  Dad:   ERR +>scu:-->#se me.< si:t +anÕ a::sk. 
   jes     -->+picks up biscuit-->   +sits down--> 
   fig                 #fig.1a 
9         (0.2)+(0.2)+   
   jes      -->+thump+ 
10        +(0.9)+ 
   jes    +brings biscuit to face+ 
11        +(2.1)+ 
   jes    +shrinks body, hides behind biscuit, gazes at mum-->> 
12 Jes:   #¼mm¼ uh some shee uh (0.2) in ere  
13        ((ÒI can see you in thereÓ)) 
   fig    #fig.1b   
 
Figure 1a     Figure 1b 
  
 
Within the overall structural organisation of dining activities, normative behaviour is 
to request an out-of-reach item from a fellow diner who can reach (e.g., Òpass the 
bread (please)Ó in Extract 1). Such a request became noticeably absent when Jessica 
began unilaterally reaching for her biscuit. Her behaviour was observably not 
commensurate with normative mealtime behaviour for obtaining additional food 
items. DadÕs imperative selects the directed action (Òsi:t anÕ a::skÓ) as the (noticeably 
absent) relevant action. His imperative directive holds Jessica accountable for not 
previously treating Ôgetting a biscuitÕ as a collaborative endeavour by soliciting 
assistance from someone who could reach the plate.  
 
Jessica spent quite some time manoeuvring herself to reach the biscuits (lines 2-8; see 
Figure 1a). In contrast, following DadÕs imperative directive, her return to a seated 
position is so rapid she lands with an audible thump (line 9). Once seated, she hides 
her face with the biscuit (line 10) and contracts her body into a tight ball (line 11; see 
Figure 1b). Whilst in this shrinking posture she transitions hiding into a playful 
activity of looking at her mother through the holes in the biscuit. Here Jessica works 
to do more than straightforward compliance (sitting down). Her additional shrinking 
gesture seems to hide away from the tacit orientation within the imperative that she 
had done something wrong - missing the relevant opportunity to ask for the biscuit 
whilst sitting correctly at the table. It perhaps also orients to the fact that she retained 
the biscuit when sitting and so did not comply with the Òand askÓ part of DadÕs 
imperative directive. We might describe this additional embodied work as a display of 
contrite compliance. Thus, JessicaÕs response to DadÕs imperative reveals her 
orientation to (and acceptance of) her accountability for failing to have performed the 
normatively relevant behaviour for gaining out-of-reach items at the table.  
 
When a recipient withholds embodied compliance and instead responds verbally to an 
imperative it typically indexes resistance to performing the directed action (Craven & 
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Potter, 2010; Mondada, 2011). Accounts for non-compliance can provide evidence 
that participants orient to being held accountable for not having already performed the 
action that the imperative retrospectively directs them to perform. In Extract 6 four 
friends are playing a card game that is known to Amy and Dan, but is new to Briana 
and Charlie. 
 
Extract 6 (LSIA Pizza and Games 18:04) 
1         *(2.8)* 
   amy    *searches cards, puts one down* 
2  Amy:   Ga:soline. 
3         +(2.2)+ 
   bri    +gazes at own cards, motionless+ 
4  Amy:   [Draw a card.] 
5  Bri:   [O:h you jusÕ] gave you:rself *ga+soline? 
                                           +....--> 
   amy                                  *.......--> 
6  Amy:   *+Yeah.*+  
          ->*points to Bri* 
   bri    ->+reaches for cards+ 
7  Bri:   [Okay. 
8  Amy:   [+Draw a ca:rd.+ 
   bri     +thumbs card stack+  
9  Bri:   +#I goddit+ I gawddit# 
          +takes card+ 
 
On line 2 Amy plays and names her card (ÒGa:solineÓ), which completes her turn in 
the game and passes responsibility for progressing the game to the next player, 
Briana. Within the structure of the game, the next action that Briana should 
accountably perform is to draw a card from the deck at the centre of the table. Briana 
does not begin her turn immediately but freezes and frowns slightly at her cards (line 
3). After 2.2 seconds, Amy directs her to ÒDraw a cardÓ (line 4). The imperative 
occurs after the directed action first became relevant. It directs Briana to perform an 
action she could, and should, have already done. In this sequential context that the 
imperative can be heard not only as directing Briana to begin her turn but also as 
holding her accountable for her failure to have already done so.  
 
AmyÕs first imperative directive overlaps with the start of BrianaÕs exclamation of 
comprehension of the meaning of the gasoline card (line 5). BrianaÕs ÒohÓ-prefaced 
turn marks the moment of her public acknowledgment of having registered the change 
in her understanding (Heritage, 1998). Her exclamation provides an account for not 
having already drawn a card on the grounds that she required additional time to 
comprehend AmyÕs previous within-game action. By making her delayed 
comprehension publicly available, Briana orients to the fact that not starting her turn 
immediately was an accountable matter (c.f., Robinson, 2016). Her account rests on 
the invocation of her identity as a Ôgood studentÕ who is more concerned about 
learning (and understanding) the game than simply going through the motions without 
thought. She constructs the sense that it is not that she was inattentive and ÔmissedÕ 
the opportunity to draw her card, rather that she prioritised a full understanding of the 
implications of the previous card over swift gameplay. Accountability orientations in 
imperative directives that target noticeable absences can be resisted by characterising 
the absence as warranted in service to a desirable social action (in this case being an 
engaged student of the game). 
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Amy only minimally confirms BrianaÕs explanation (ÒyeahÓ) and then repeats her 
imperative directive, this time accompanied by a pointing gesture (line 6-8). The 
second version reinstates and even enhances the sense that Briana is accountable for 
failing to progress the game by starting her turn in a timely manner. It rejects BrianaÕs 
effort to understand the game as a viable account for delaying drawing a card and 
continues to hold her accountable.  
 
Briana pushes back against the second imperative directive with her prosodically 
exaggerated Ò#I goddit I gawddit#Ó (line 9). This claims prior awareness that drawing 
a card was the next relevant action. Stivers (2004, p. 260) suggests that multiple 
sayings treat the prior speaker as having Òpersisted unnecessarily in the prior course 
of actionÓ (in this case issuing the repeated imperative) and indicates that they should 
desist. By the second imperative directive Briana has already begun preparations to 
take a card (line 5); she has shifted her grip on her cards to free her arm and started 
reaching for a new card (line 6). BrianaÕs response (line 9) resists the necessity of the 
imperative on the grounds that she was already aware of its relevance as a next action 
and was already engaged in the directed action so had not missed the opportunity to 
perform it.  
 
Extracts 5 and 6 demonstrate some (but by no means all) of the ways recipients might 
orient to their accountability for failing to progress a projectably relevant course of 
action: They can accept their accountability and display contrition (Extract 5), attempt 
to provide a legitimate account (Extract 6 line 5) or reject the implication that they 
have done something for which they should be held accountable at all (Extract 6 line 
8). In each case the recipients acknowledge the tacit accountability-orientation of the 
imperative directive. 
 
 
Sources of Relevance for the Direction Action  
 
Potentially any missed opportunity to perform an interactionally relevant action is an 
accountable matter in interaction (Garfinkel, 1983; 1967). Although the specific 
contingencies that lead to the directed action becoming relevant vary in the examples 
above; the accountability-oriented imperative directives have each been made relevant 
within normative social organisations in interaction. The relevance of telling the story 
was sequentially generated following its initiation and subsequent go ahead (Extract 
3). The incantation of Òbon appetitÓ at the dinner table marked the beginning of the 
meal and made relevant its consumption (Extract 4). Sitting and asking became a 
relevant next action within the normative rituals of mealtime etiquette when Jessica 
sought to procure an out-of reach biscuit (Extract 5). Drawing a card became a 
relevant next action within the overall structural organisation of the game once Amy 
played her card (Extract 6). In each case, an accountability-oriented imperative 
indexed the speakerÕs stance towards the projectable relevance of the directed action 
and the recipientÕs accountability for the inaction.  
 
 
TURN DESIGN AND SEQUENTIAL POSITION 
 
Orientations to accountability can be made more explicit through turn design features. 
Across the collection we regularly observed the use of prosody (e.g. ÒEa:tÓ in Extract 
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3 and ÒERR >scu:se me.< si:t anÕ a::sk.Ó in Extract 5), profanity (e.g., ÒgoddamnÓ in 
Extract 4) and propriety and promptness oriented adverbs (e.g., ÒCover your self up 
properlyÓ, ÒEat nicely pleaseÓ).!Although accountability-oriented turn design features 
are often present, this is not always the case. The timing of the imperative relative to 
the point at which the directed action first becomes relevant can be sufficient to 
convey an orientation to the recipientÕs accountability for the inaction. Extract 7 
extends Extract 6 to include an additional imperative directive with almost identical 
turn design features to Òdraw a cardÓ (Òplay a mileÓ on line 11).!
 
Extract 7 (LSIA Pizza and Games 18:04) 
8  Amy:   [Draw a ca:rd. 
9  Bri:   #I goddit I gawddit# 
10 Cha:   tch huh huh huh 
11        (0.5)+(0.2)+ 
   bri         +adds card to hand+ 
12 Dan:   Play a mile. 
13        (0.6) 
14 Bri:   +AlÕight.+ 
          +selects card from hand+ 
 
After Briana has drawn a new card she inspects it alongside her existing hand of 
cards. Whilst she is inspecting her cards in a display of deciding which one to play, 
Dan uses an imperative formulation to direct her to Òplay a mileÓ (line 12). Although 
grammatically and prosodically similar to Òdraw a cardÓ (line 8), the action is 
different. ÒPlay a mileÓ selects a ÔmileÕ card as the relevant type of card to play from 
all of the possible alternatives. Unlike Òdraw a cardÓ which treated Briana as remiss in 
not already having done so, ÒPlay a mileÓ seeks to expedite the card selection process 
that Briana was visibly engaged in. No such card selection activity was required prior 
to drawing a card from the face-down stack, nor was the playing of a ÔmileÕ card 
specifically relevant before the imperative directive. As such it is an affiliative action 
designed to assist Briana with the action she is currently performing rather than treat 
her as accountable for having failed to complete an already relevant action.  
 
We can use BrianaÕs response as evidence of her understanding of the imperative 
directive. Her initial verbal response (ÒAlÕightÓ on line 14) acknowledges DanÕs 
choice of card type before she moves to play the card. Importantly, ÒalÕightÓ does not 
claim prior epistemic access to the need to play a mile or otherwise imply that Briana 
was aware of the relevance of playing a mile prior to the imperative directive being 
issued (Heritage, 2012). It treats DanÕs imperative directive as an affiliative action 
designed to resolve the problem she was experiencing in choosing which card to play.  
 
ÒPlay a mileÓ, whilst grammatically comparable to ÒDraw a cardÓ, has a very different 
orientation regarding BrianaÕs accountability for the directed action. It does not direct 
an already relevant action that the recipient could and should have performed. Instead 
it specifies which of a range of newly relevant actions should be performed now that 
they have become relevant. Despite the similar turn design features of the two 
imperative directives, Extract 7 demonstrates that participants are sensitive to the 
subtle timings of the relevance of actions relative to the imperatives that direct them 
and any additional accountability work that is conveyed by imperatives that occur 
after the recipient has failed to perform an already relevant next action. This is an 
issue we consider in more detail in the next section. 
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IMPERATIVES THAT COINCIDE 
 WITH THE RELEVANCE OF DIRECTED ACTION  
 
Whether an imperative holds the recipient accountable for a failure to perform a 
relevant action or simply directs them to perform a newly relevant action pivots, as 
we have seen, on its timing in relation to the moment at which the directed action 
becomes projectably relevant within the interaction. This tipping point is best 
illustrated with an example of an imperative timed to coincide precisely with the 
moment the directed action becomes relevant. In Extract 8, Rick and Luke are 
choosing which game pieces to use. Luke has the game pieces in front of him but has 
not yet selected one. After Rick chooses to play as the car (line 1), Luke continues to 
fiddle with the remaining pieces (lines 3-6).  
 
Extract 8 (Monopoly Boys 02:02)  
1  RIC:   +I'll be the uhm- (0.4) the car (I guess) 
   luk    +moves pieces around on board--> 
2         (1.2) 
3  RIC:   do you want me to the bank or weÕll just- you know 
4         we'll just leave it over here 
5  LUK:   mm 
6         (0.2)*(0.8)* 
   ric         *slides box near board*  
7  RIC:   alright just (pick a pick a pick a) 
8  LUK:   +oka:y yeah. 
          -->+.....-->  
9         (0.3)  
10 LUK:   +I'll [be] th[e-] 
11 RIC:         [y-]   [yo]u're being +the #cup. 
   luk    +grasps pieces-->        -->+lifts pieces--> 
   fig                                     #fig.2a 
12 RIC:    *put that# *on *[this *thing 
13 LUK:                    [the cup 
   ric     *..........*taps*,,,,,* 
   fig              #fig.2b 
14         +(0.3)+(0.2) 
   luk     -->+drops pieces in box+ 
!
Figure 2a      Figure 2b 
!! !
 
When Rick presses Luke to decide, using an imperative directive that orients to 
LukeÕs accountability (line 7), Luke begins to scoop up the game pieces, leaving one 
behind, which Rick then registers as the one he has selected (line 11; see Figure 2a). 
As Luke begins to lift his hand from the board and move it towards the box, Rick 
directs him to Òput that on this thingÓ (line 12) and quickly taps a spot in the box (see 
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Figure 2b). This directive does not initiate a new course of action (cf., Òpass the bread 
(please)Ó in Extract 1), nor does it direct the recipient to perform a relevant action that 
has been displaced or withheld (cf., ÒeatÓ in Extract 3). It indicates where Luke should 
place the pieces at exactly the moment in which they begin their journey, thus 
expediting the completion of the action. Crucially, when Rick issues the directive, 
Luke could not have been expected to have already put the pieces in the box. Timed 
to coincide with the relevance of the directed action, the directive thus does not find 
fault in the otherÕs actions or inactions, but is rather an affiliative action designed to 
expedite an in-progress course of action.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Imperatives that are sequentially located after the directed action first becomes 
relevant in the interaction explicitly direct the actions of the recipient and tacitly hold 
them accountable for the inaction. Wherever a projectably relevant next action is not 
performed there exists the potential for someone to be held accountable. For example, 
Schegloff (1988, p. 125) states that noticing a negative event (e.g., Òyou didnÕt get an 
ice cream sandwichÓ) formulates a failure by the recipient and can be mobilised as a 
vehicle for complaining about the absence of a relevant action. We know that 
interlocutors are alert to the importance of monitoring the projectable relevance of 
actions, such that they might contribute to their smooth progression. For example, 
Kendrick & Drew (2016, p. 2) describe a range of Òpractised solutionsÓ through 
which individuals can anticipate and meet unexpressed needs of their co-participants. 
Relatedly, Drew and Couper-Kuhlen (2014) note that participants can be held 
accountable for failing to observe obvious attempts to recruit their help and respond in 
a timely manner.  
 
We have argued that the sequential position of the imperative directive is crucial, a 
Ôtop-downÕ analysis in LevinsonÕs (2013) terms, but we have also identified turn-
constructional practices that routinely occur in accountability-oriented imperative 
directives, a Ôbottom-upÕ solution. These practices range from relatively explicit (e.g., 
profanity) to more subtle (e.g., prosodic stress). We suggest, however, that any 
imperative directive that occurs after the relevance of the directed action has been 
established is vulnerable to being heard as holding the recipient accountable. In many 
cases, we find a mutually elaborative harmony between the position and composition 
of imperative actions (c.f., Schegloff, 1995). In this way our results are similar to 
CurlÕs (2006) analysis of the congruity between the sequential environment and 
syntactic design of offers. Yet we have broadened the notion of Ôsequential positionÕ 
to encompass positions that emerge not only within sequences of talk, but also within 
practical courses of action. We have shown that even units of talk with the same 
syntactic design (i.e., imperative grammar) can perform different actions in different 
positions. Our analysis also contributes to previous research on the relationship 
between projectability and directives/requests (e.g., Mondada, 2014a; Rossi, 2014), 
showing how the normative structures of projectable courses of action furnish 
resources for action formation.  
 
Imperative directives privilege getting the action done over other concerns, including, 
as we have seen here, soliciting accounts for social transgressions. Imperatives are not 
overtly designed to elicit an account in the way that account-implicative interrogatives 
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(Bolden & Robinson, 2011), accusations (e.g., Drew, 1978), complaints (e.g., Dersley 
& Wootton, 2000; Drew, 1998), noticings (Antaki, 1994), or other formats that 
routinely generate responsive accounts might. Using an imperative formulation 
signals that the speakerÕs primary concern is to restore the progressivity of the action 
rather than to topicalise the recipientÕs transgression. Nevertheless, our analysis has 
shown that imperatives located after the relevance of the directed action do treat the 
recipient as accountable for failing to progress the directed action. When delivered 
after the directed action first became relevant, imperatives are a tacit and covert way 
of holding recipients accountable for their transgressions. In this respect they are not 
unlike the implicit format for correcting (Jefferson, 1987) or pursuing a response 
(Bolden, Mendelbaum & Wilkinson, 2012).  
 
One social context in which tacit accountability orientations might facilitate a relevant 
social action is in the arena of socialising novices into socially normative behaviours. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, our game playing and family mealtime corpora were replete 
with such actions. By using an imperative where the explicit focus is on getting the 
action done one can avoid forcing the recipient into a situation where their ignorance 
or disobedience is topicalised, whilst still tacitly indexing a failure. Imperatives that 
occur after the relevance of the directed action direct the recipient to perform the 
action, thus progressing the course of action and enabling participation in the overall 
activity to continue. They explicitly identify the action that should already have been 
performed, thereby scaffolding the recipientÕs future performance of socially 
normative behaviour and remedying the (unstated) possibility of the recipient not 
knowing what action should have been performed. They tacitly treat the recipient as 
responsible for the transgression without soliciting or making relevant an account for 
the failure, thus retrospectively enforcing social norms. This provides an opportunity 
for the recipient to learn normative standards of acceptable behaviour from specific 
moments of transgression of social norms without delaying the progressivity of the 
course of action during the interaction.  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A normative metric of progressivity underpins the sequential organisation of 
interaction. Imperative directives are a resource available for managing the 
progressivity of our interlocutorsÕ actions. When things are expected to be done at a 
particular place in the interaction and they are not done there is a breach of the normal 
progressivity of the action. Imperatives can be used to draw attention to moments 
when a course of action is failing to progress according to normative expectations. 
Imperatives are one tool for retrospectively marking the breach and enforcing the 
social norms of progressivity by restoring the forward momentum of the course of 
action. Thus, accountability-oriented imperative directives are a tool for the ex post 
facto enforcement of social norms. 
 
The timing of the imperative relative to the progressivity of the action is sufficient to 
indicate whether it straightforwardly directs the actions of the recipient or 
simultaneously directs and holds then accountable for their prior inaction. The 
explicitness of the accountability orientation can be enhanced through the inclusion of 
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additional prosodic or lexical markers that index accountability. However, if you tell 
someone to do an action that they could have and should have already performed, the 
directive is potentially hearable as admonishing the recipient purely by virtue of its 
relationship to progressivity. 
 
 
CONVENTIONS FOR MULTIMODAL TRANSCRIPTION  
!
Embodied actions are transcribed following the conventions developed by Mondada 
(2014b). 
 
*   * 
+   + 
Gestures and descriptions of embodied actions are delimited between ++ two identical 
symbols (one symbol per participant) and are synchronized with correspondent stretches of 
talk. 
*---> 
--->* 
The action described continues across subsequent lines until the same symbol is reached. 
>> The action described begins before the excerptÕs beginning. 
--->> The action described continues after the excerptÕs end. 
..... ActionÕs preparation. 
,,,,, ActionÕs retraction. 
ali Participant doing the embodied action is identified when (s)he is not the speaker. 
fig 
# 
The exact moment at which a screen shot has been taken is indicated with a specific sign 
showing its position within turn at talk. 
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